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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida evidence has continued to develop in the same predictable
patterns as seen in previous survey years.' The areas of relevance and
hearsay generated the most case law during the survey period, and
criminal decisions again outnumbered civil cases in generating eviden-
tiary case law.
Changes made during the 1990 legislative session should have a
distinct impact on Florida evidence. These changes will have the big-
gest affect in the areas of relevance,2 impeachment,3 exclusion of wit-
nesses4 and hearsay. 5 The change that will probably generate the most
1. This is the fifth annual survey of Florida evidence that the Nova Law Review
has published. The annual survey generally runs from December of one calendar year
through November of the following year. A break in the annual survey of evidence
occurred last year. Therefore, to bring the evidence survey up to date, this issue will
consider Florida evidence decisions from October 1988 through October 1990.
2. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 40 (West) amended section 794.022 of the Florida
Statutes which affects the rules of evidence concerning relevancy. This change directly
affects section 90.404(1)(b)1 (Supp. 1990) regarding the character of the victim by
"excluding evidence presented for the purpose of showing that manner of dress of the
victim at the time of the offense incited the sexual battery." 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
90-40 (West).
3. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 174 (West), amending FLA. STAT. § 90.608 (1989).
This change allows a party to impeach his own witness. See FLA. STAT. § 90.608
(1989).
4. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 174 (West) created section 90.616 of the Florida
Statutes, which is a codification of the term "invoking the rule," or more commonly
stated as sequestration of witnesses. The section reads as follows:
(1) At the request of a party the court shall order, or upon its own motion
the court may order, witnesses excluded from a proceeding so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses except as provided in subsec-
tion (2).
(2) A witness may not be excluded if he is:
(a) A party who is a natural person.
(b) In a civil case, an officer or employee of a party that is not a
natural person. The party's attorney shall designate the officer or employee
who shall be the party's representative.
(c) A person whose presence is shown by the party's attorney to be
essential to the presentation of the party's cause.
FLA. STAT. § 90.616 (Supp. 1990).
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problems, and the most case law, will be the change in impeachment.
The impact of this change will be distinctly felt in the criminal area.'
This article will discuss the major cases affecting Florida evidence
law. As with prior surveys, the focus will be on Florida Supreme Court
cases. District and circuit court cases will be discussed if the impact on
Florida evidence is significant, or an important conflict between Florida
jurisdictions is present.
II. CONTEMPORANEOUS OBIECTION RULE AND OFFERS OF
PROOF
Though a varying amount of case law was generated in this evi-
dentiary area during the survey period, the importance of making con-
temporaneous objections and offers of proof at trial cannot be under-
stated.' Although no significant changes occurred in this evidentiary
5. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 174 (West), amending FLA. STAT. §§ 90.803(23),
90.804(2)(c) (1989).
6. Though there will be an impact on civil cases as well as criminal, the criminal
cases will probably generate more law since prosecutors will be able to call hostile or
adverse witnesses and impeach them without the necessity of using section
90.801(2)(a) or declaring the witness adverse under section 90.608(2). Subsection (2)
was eliminated after the 1990 amendment to section 90.608.
Some attorneys, on a literal reading of section 90.801(2)(a), believe that this sec-
tion merely makes inconsistent statements nonhearsay because they are not used to
prove the truth of the matter asserted but are simply used to demonstrate that an in
court statement differs from an out of court statement. This is a misreading of section
90.801(2)(a) because it allows the prior inconsistent statement to be offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. Professor Ehrhardt stated it best in his treatise on
evidence:
Although normally a witness may not be impeached by the party who calls
him, that restriction is not applicable to a statement offered under
[s]ection 90.801(2)(a) because the purpose for offering the evidence is to
prove the truth of the contents of the prior statement rather than to attack
the credibility of the witness.
C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE 449 (2d ed. 1984). This is important in criminal
cases because it allows the prosecutor to argue the truth of the inconsistent statements
in closing. This area has caused a lot of reversals, if the appellate court finds that
impeachment under section 90.801(2)(a) does not meet all the prerequisites of that
section.
7. See FLA. STAT. § 90.104 (1989), providing in part that:
(1) A court may predicate error . . . on the basis of admitted . . . evi-
dence when a substantial right of the party is adversely affected and: (a)
When the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to
strike appears on the record, stating the specific ground of objection . ..
1991] 1133
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area, Florida courts examined various cases during the survey period of
which the following are worth noting.
In Glendening v. State,8 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
defendant's conviction because defense counsel failed to object when
the State's expert witness testified that the father of the sexual abuse
victim was the person who actually committed the sexual offense. The
court ruled that the testimony was more prejudicial than probative, but
declined to reverse the conviction finding that "[d]efense counsel
neither objected to the answer nor moved to strike it and the error was
not of a fundamental nature . [Therefore], the issue was not prop-
erly preserved for appeal . ... " Additionally, the court stated that
although the State's expert witness was "improperly allowed to vouch
for the credibility of a witness," the issue was not cognizable on appeal
because defense counsel objected on the grounds of relevance, and not
because "the question called for improper vouching for the credibility
of the hearsay declarant."' 10
(b) When the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evi-
dence was made known to the court by offer of proof or was apparent from
the context within which the questions were asked.
A proper contemporaneous objection has two primary ingredients, both of which are
needed to preserve objections for appellate review. First, the objection must be timely.
If counsel does not promptly object, the problem is waived. Second, the objection must
be specific. Failure to state the correct grounds for objection will waive it. The appel-
late courts have strictly monitored this rule.
A proper offer of proof merely requires that when evidence is excluded, the sub-
stance of the evidence must be made known to the court. If the substance of the proof
is not apparent from the record, the appellate court will be unable to render a decision
on the excluded evidence and will thus dismiss the argument for failare to properly
have substance of the excluded evidence before it.
8. 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988).
9. Id. at 221.
10. Id. The court seems to be splitting hairs regarding the specificity needed to
preserve an issue for appeal. Though the court did not elaborate on the relevance objec-
tion by defense counsel, it would seem that counsel may have made the correct objec-
tion. Vouching for the credibility of a witness brings into play a witness's character
under section 90.404, which states that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of
his character is inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular
occasion . . . ." FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (Supp. 1989). Additionally, vouching for an indi-
vidual's credibility can, in fact, be more prejudicial than probative since the jury may
give that individual's testimony more weight than it normally would have. See FLA.
STAT. § 90.403 (1989). This is alleviated when the individual's credibility has already
been attacked.
Some trial judges may not allow objections such as "improper vouching for the
credibility of the hearsay declarant" but may instead ask for the "legal objection."
1134 [Vol. 15
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In Assiag v. State,"1 the Fifth District Court of Appeal also af-
firmed a defendant's conviction, even though two expert witnesses im-
properly vouched for the credibility of the sex crime victim. The court
stated that, by itself, the error was not fundamental and therefore,
failed to justify reversal in the absence of a timely objection. 2 The
district court went on to compare other cases where similar errors oc-
curred and no objection was made, but the court, nevertheless, found
those errors fundamental. The Fifth District stated that those cases in-
volved cumulative errors which combined to deny the defendant a fair
trial and rose to the level of fundamental error. 13
Making an objection, based on relevance under section 90.404 because the question
calls for improper character evidence, should be specific enough. However, a proper,
and perhaps more specific objection, could be fnade under section 90.609, which pro-
vides that evidence of the truthful character of a witness is only admissible "after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by reputation evidence."
FLA. STAT. § 90.609 (1989).
Another specific "legal objection" could be made under section 90.806 regarding
attacking and supporting the credibility of a hearsay declarant. FLA. STAT. § 90.806
(1989). It is improper to vouch for the credibility of a hearsay declarant whose credi-
bility has not been attacked. However, both section 90.609 and section 90.806 are
grounded in the rule of relevance, which states that the jury will attach more weight to
a witness whose credibility is bolstered by others. Since the court did not elaborate on
the specifics of the relevance objection in the Glendening case, the reader is left to
speculate regarding the proper specificity of these other objections. See Glendening,
536 So. 2d at 212.
This case, once again, illustrates the importance of making specific objections at
trial. It also demonstrates that all possible objections should be raised if there is a
reasonable basis for the objection.
11. 565 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
12. Id. at 388.
13. Id. Cumulative error cases generally point out that counsel was ineffective
during trial. In criminal cases, this type of error may be more appropriate under the
collateral attack provisions of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 for ineffective
assistance of counsel. Although an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is
rarely allowed on direct appeal, it may be brought before the court when the errors are
apparent on the record. Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct 2575 (1991); Foster v. State, 387 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1052 (1984). However, since ineffective assistance of counsel claims are rarely appar-
ent from the record, this would preclude direct review and would confine this claim to
collateral attack. This would, in essence, deter the appellate court from examining the
case in light of cumulative error on direct appeal and move the court to examine the
case from a more advantageous perspective under the standard set out in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for ineffective assistance of counsel, after a collat-
eral attack has been made. In this way the court can examine the case from the per-
spective of whether counsel's lack of objection was a strategic decision designed to al-
5
Bruschi: Evidence
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
In Fernandez v. State,4 the trial court excluded two statements
directly affecting the defendant's alibi defense. The district court af-
firmed the conviction because there was no proffer of the statements,
nor were the statements apparent from the record. 5
Finally, the district court, in G.A. v. State,"6 reversed the trial
court when the trial court refused to allow the defense attorney to prof-
fer excluded testimony. The district court concluded that defense coun-
sel's failure to state the relevancy and materiality did not preclude re-
view of the issue, because the trial court cut off defense counsel's
proffer. The proffer was necessary for the appellate court to determine
whether the testimony was relevant, and material, and the trial court
erred by refusing to allow the proffer. 7
III. RELEVANCY
Relevance forms the basic foundation for every evidentiary princi-
ple "'8 and should be closely examined whenever evidence is being en-
tered pursuant to any rule in the evidence code.' 9 Relevance is best
understood by remembering two basic fundamentals. First, is the evi-
low the defense to explore previously closed evidentiary areas in defending the client,
by allowing the State to "open the door" to previously excluded evidence, instead of
from the prospective of cumulative error.
14. 555 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
15. In a somewhat similar case, the district court in Reaves v. State, 531 So. 2d
401 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988), a case reported in the last survey period, reversed a
conviction even though there was no proffer of the surrebuttal testimony in the trial
court. The district court stated that the proffer was not needed because the trial judge
believed that surrebuttal did not exist in Florida and, therefore, the proffer would have
been unavailing. The attorney in Reaves was fortunate that the trial jadge stated that
he did not believe surrebuttal existed in Florida, otherwise the error would not have
been preserved for review.
16. 549 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
17. Id. at 1204.
18. See Garcia v. State, 564 So. 2d 124, 126 (Fla. 1990); Swafford v. State, 533
So. 2d 270, 274-75 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100 (1989) (standing for the
proposition that relevance permeates all other evidentiary rules).
For an excellent article on relevancy, see Pearson, Ungarbling Relevancy, FLA.
BAR J. 45 (Feb. 1990).
19. As an example, even though evidence may fall clearly within an exception to
the hearsay rule, if the hearsay is not relevant it should not come into evidence. Simi-
larly, even though a piece of evidence is authentic, or self-authenticating, if the evi-
dence is not relevant to any fact in issue, or the evidence is more prejudicial than
probative, it should not come into evidence.
1136 [Vol. 15
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dence logically relevant? That is, will the evidence prove or disprove a
material fact in issue? 20 Second, is the evidence legally relevant? In
other words, will the evidence be prohibited by specific statutory law21
or will its probative value be "outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or needless pres-
20. FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (1989).
21. FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (1989). The author's position is that once it has been
demonstrated that an item of evidence will make a material fact in issue more or less
probative, then the only basis for excluding the item from evidence is a legal rule of
law. Therefore, the author finds that section 90.402 and section 90.403 should be
lumped together under the term of legal relevance. Professor Ehrhardt has recognized
the broad concept of legal relevance and stated that "[t]hese exclusionary policy rules,
often referred to under the concept of legal relevancy, are included in sections 90.403-
404 and 90-407-410 of the Code." C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 90.402.1 (2d
ed. 1984).
Section 90.402 states that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as pro-
vided by law." FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (1989). This section would exclude logically rele-
vant evidence when a statute specifically prohibits it. Two examples excluding relevant
evidence are section 934.06, which excludes logically relevant evidence obtained by a
wire-tap in violation of the Florida Statutes, and section 794.022, which excludes spe-
cific instances of sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the
offender. See FLA. STAT. §§ 794.022, 934.06 (1989).
Section 90.403 is also a rule of law that excludes logically relevant evidence when
its probative value is outweighed by "unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading
the jury or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1989).
Therefore, both sections are categorized under the term of legal relevance.
11371991]
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entation of cumulative evidence?"'2 2 By examining all evidence for logi-
cal and legal relevance, the trial attorney can minimize the use of
harmful evidence and safeguard against error and possible reversal.23
The following flow chart demonstrates the relationship between logical and legal
relevance:
evidence
-NO excluded
-NO---Jevidence
-NO excluded
evidence
YES excluded
NOI
The evidence is
ADMISSIBLE
22. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1989).
23. Logical and legal relevance are the watchdogs of evidence. For example, an
improper evidentiary foundation can be excluded from evidence based on relevance
grounds.
A typical scenario has opposing counsel attempting to enter a hearsay statement in
evidence as an excited utterance. The foundation for an excited utterance is:
1138 [Vol. 15
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A. Logical Relevance
Logical relevance is defined in section 90.401 of the Florida Stat-
utes and determines whether the relevant evidence is evidence "tending
to prove or disprove a material fact." '24 Though many cases discuss log-
ical relevance, they are dependant on the logical connection between
the evidence and the matter it is being offered to prove or disprove in
that particular factual setting. Therefore, a slight change in the fact
pattern can produce a substantially different result. This does not lead
to sound precedential value and, generally, offers little guidance, other
than the court's analysis during that particular factual setting. How-
ever, a few cases are worth discussing.
In Martinez v. State,2 5 the issue of DNA fingerprinting in Florida
was once again the center of attention. The issue was whether the over-
whelming statistical probabilities of DNA fingerprint evidence invades
the province of the jury by suggesting proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 26 The court held that it did not. The court stated that rigorous
1. A statement or utterance,
2. relating to a startling event or condition,
3. while the declarant,
4. was under the stress of excitement,
5. caused by the event or condition.
FLA. STAT. § 90.803 (Supp. 1990).
Opposing counsel does not elicit testimony that the statement was made under the
stress of excitement. The statement must be examined under the auspices of logical and
legal relevance. First, does the statement make some fact in issue more or less proba-
tive? If the statement does not make a fact in issue more or less probative, then the
statement is not relevant and does not go into evidence. There is no need to examine
the statement for legal relevance. If the statement does make a fact in issue more or
less probative, then it is logically relevant and to this point, admissible.
Second, is the statement outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of issues, misleading the jury, or needless cumulative evidence? If the statement was
not made under the stress of excitement, then it is more prejudicial than probative and
not legally relevant, and should be inadmissible as evidence. The reasoning is simple. A
person who is excited as a result of a startling event does not have the reflective capac-
ity which is essential for conscious misrepresentation. If the foundational element of
excitement is left out, then the individual making the statement could easily fabricate
it. The reliability of the hearsay statement is, therefore, in question. The statement's
probative value may be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice it
could cause the opposing party, and it could also mislead the jury. The jury could reach
an incorrect verdict based on an unreliable statement fabricated out of court.
24. FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (1989).
25. 549 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
26. DNA material recovered from the victim's clothing matched the defendant's
1991] 1139
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cross-examination of expert witnesses, or an attack upon the scientific
bases upon which the statistical proofs are based, will guard against
such errors.2 8 The Martinez court agreed with the large majority of out
of state courts in reaching its conclusion that overwhelming statistical
probability is both relevant and probative in assisting the jury in mak-
ing its final decision, when the statistical probability testimony is scien-
tifically and reliably grounded.29
In Odice v. Pearson,30 plaintiff was stabbed in a restaurant park-
ing lot. The plaintiff brought suit against the restaurant owners for
negligent lighting and security. At trial, plaintiff attempted to enter
police reports concerning prior crimes committed near the restaurant
owners' property in order to establish the owners' failure to foresee
criminal activity and take reasonable precautions to guard against
crime on the restaurant premises. The trial court excluded the police
reports regarding the prior crimes. 31 The appellate court reversed, find-
ing the police reports of prior crimes relevant and probative of a mate-
rial fact in issue, foreseeability. 32 The appellate court stated that
"[e]vidence as to the nature and likelihood of any crime occurring has
a direct bearing on whether the preventive measures taken by the prop-
erty owner were reasonable in light of all the other relevant facts and
circumstances in the case."33
DNA. The State's expert testified that only one individual in 243 billion would have
the same DNA pattern. Id. at 695. Since the present population of the world is only
five billion, it makes the argument of identity rather overwhelming, as well as
compelling.
27. Id. at 694.
28. Id. at 697.
29. The State had little evidence to prove the identity of the victim's attacker.
The victim suffered from a form of night blindness and the attack took place at night
with the electrical current severed from outside the house. The victim's description of
her attacker was less than accurate and the best piece of evidence the State had to
prove the defendant's identity was a fingerprint from the victim's electrical box. There-
fore, the DNA fingerprint material was highly probative of a material fact in issue, the
defendant's identity. Because there was little other identity evidence, its probative value
simply outweighed the prejudicial effect of the overwhelming statistics. Id.
30. 549 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
31. Id. at 706.
32. Id.
33. Id.
1140 [Vol. 15
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B. Exclusion on the Grounds of Unfair Prejudice or Confu-
sion-Legal Relevance
One form of legal relevance is defined in Florida Statutes section
90.403.14 Once the prerequisites of logical relevance have been satis-
fied, it must be determined if the evidence is legally relevant. Is there a
statutory law which excludes the evidence or is the evidence more prej-
udicial than probative? Numerous cases decided during the survey pe-
riod relied upon section 90.403. However, few cases demonstrated any
remarkable significance. 5 For example, appellate courts have contin-
ued to examine gruesome photographs, which are entered into evidence
at the trial level, to determine if they are unduly prejudicial.3 6 How-
ever, no cases demonstrate a break or change in the courts' analysis of
such evidence. Additionally, no courts have changed the standard usage
or analysis of section 90.403 regarding other relevant evidence.
In one application of section 90.403, the Second District Court of
Appeal, in State v. Sawyer,3 7 held that the admission of a single hair
found in the murder victim's apartment, alleged to be that of the de-
fendant, had the danger of unfairly prejudicing the defendant. During
a pre-trial hearing on a motion in limine, an FBI hair and fiber expert
testified that the hair in question matched the defendant's in twenty
34. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1989).
35. Cases excluding evidence based on statutory law under section 90.402 are
discussed under the specific evidentiary sections they affect.
36. See Thompson v. State, 565 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 1990). In Thompson, the
Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court has discretion to admit photographic
evidence as long as that evidence is relevant. Photographs of the murder victim were
relevant to establish the victim's identity and to demonstrate that the defendant's out-
of-court confessions were consistent with the physical evidence found at the scene, so
that the gruesome nature of the photographs did not render the decision to admit them
an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1315; see also Gomaco Corp. v. Faith, 550 So. 2d 482
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989). In Gomaco, the court held that photographs of the
accident victim's nearly severed foot may have been tangentially relevant to the vic-
tim's action against the manufacturer of the curbing machine the victim was operating
when he suffered the injury. However, relevance was overwhelmingly outweighed by
the photographs' gruesome and inflammatory nature, which was prejudicial to the
manufacturer. Id. at 483. The photographs did not in themselves independently estab-
lish any material part of the victim's case, nor were they necessary to corroborate some
disputed factual issue. Id. But see Tompkins v. Dugger, 549 So. .2d 1370 (Fla. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1170 (1990) (decision of the trial judge to admit inflammatory
photographs of murder victim's skeletal remains was within his discretion).
37. 561 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1991] 1141
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observable characteristics. 8 However, this only meant that the hair
came from a class of individuals having the same hair characteristics.
The expert also testified with regard to how hair is transferred from
place to place. Although the defendant had stated he was never in the
victim's apartment, he lived next door and the victim had visited his
apartment a few days before the murder. The trial court ruled that the
hair had no probative value regarding the defendant's presence in the
victim's apartment at the time of the murder.39 The appellate court
affirmed and indicated that admission of the hair would seriously
prejudice the defendant before the jury.40 The court explained:
[T]he probative value of the single hair cannot be positively identi-
fied as being from [the defendant]. Even if it is his hair, it is simply
not probative of proving that [the defendant] was even in [the vic-
tim's] apartment much less that he was there at the time of the
murder in light of the extensive contamination of the crime scene.
However, [the defendant] could have been seriously prejudiced
before the jury if this hair evidence were presented to them.4'
In West v. State,42 the appellate court reversed the defendant's
conviction for DUI manslaughter, stating that the trial court commit-
ted reversible error in admitting evidence that the defendant had a
trace of valium in his blood. Expert testimony in the case indicated that
the valium had no measurable effect on the defendant's driving. There-
fore, the evidence concerning the valium had no probative value, or
relevance, to the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol and
was unfairly prejudicial.43
The West court cited to State v. McClain in finding error in ad-
mitting this evidence.44 McClain was a case similar to West, where the
court found testimony regarding drugs found in the defendant's system
more prejudicial than probative since the State already had a high
blood alcohol reading on which to prove impairment.45 There is still
38. Id. at 283.
39. Id. at 284.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 553 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
43. Id. at 255.
44. 508 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), af'd, 525 So. 2d 420 (Fla.
1988).
45. Id. at 1260.
1142 [Vol. 15
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some confusion caused by State v. Weitz," even after the Florida Su-
preme Court's decision in McClain resolved the apparent conflict be-
tween the cases.4" Weitz involved the introduction of evidence regard-
ing drugs in the defendant's system after the State had already taken a
breath reading. However, the breath reading in the case was only
0.017 %, and the drugs offered the only reasonable explanation for the
defendant's acute intoxication, even though the drugs in the defend-
ant's system could not be quantified.48 It can only be assumed that in
West, the State had the necessary blood alcohol level needed to prove
impairment, since this information was not included in the case facts.
C. Character Evidence in General
Character evidence inevitably causes judges and attorneys innu-
merable headaches and numerous reversals. General character evidence
is codified in section 90.404(1) of the Florida Statutes, and is a general
prohibition against using a person's character, or a trait of the person's
character, to prove that the person acted in conformity with that char-
acter trait on a particular occasion.49 This general prohibition has a few
enumerated exceptions,5" generally limited to criminal cases.51
46. 500 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986), overruled, 525 So. 2d 420
(Fla. 1988).
47. The Florida Supreme Court addressed Weitz in McClain and stated:
In both cases, it could be said that the prejudicial impact of permitting the
jury to hear that the defendant had taken illegal drugs was equal but that
it was the difference in probative value which tipped the scales. In Weitz,
the defendant's low blood alcohol test belied the other evidence of his in-
toxication. Thus, the presence of even a small amount of drugs in the de-
fendant's urine was significant because it provided an explanation for his
impaired conduct. In the instant case, McClain's blood alcohol level sub-
stantially exceeded the figure necessary to raise a presumption of impair-
ment. Therefore, evidence of a trace amount of cocaine in McClain's blood
added little to the state's proof of intoxication.
McClain, 525 So. 2d at 423.
48. Weitz, 500 So. 2d at 657-58.
49. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1) (Supp. 1990).
50. The particular character of the accused, of the victim, or of a witness all
have special exemptions. FLA. STAT. § 90.401(1)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1990). Similar fact evi-
dence is basically character evidence which is admissible under specific circumstances.
Similar fact evidence, otherwise known as the "Williams Rule," from the case of Wil-
liams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959), will be
discussed infra note 65 and accompanying text.
51. Section 90.404(1) provides that character evidence is inadmissible to prove
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In Erickson v. State,52 the defendant objected to expert psychiat-
ric testimony presented by the State in an indecent assault case on a
child under sixteen. The State's expert witness testified that the defend-
ant's condition was diagnosed as pedophilia and antisocial behavior.53
The expert also testified that the defendant had not been truthful dur-
ing the psychiatric interview. The State claimed that this testimony
was needed to rebut the defendant's defense, regarding lack of intent,
and to establish the defendant's capacity to understand and waive his
rights.54 The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the
State's position and found that the testimony was inadmissible charac-
ter evidence. 55 The court determined that: (1) the testimony was used
to demonstrate the defendant's bad character and propensity to the
commit the crime charged; and (2) expert testimony is not allowed to
attack the credibility of the defendant when the defendant has not be-
come a witness in the case. 56
A type of character evidence which causes innumerable problems
is "high crime area" testimony. A number of cases have been devoted
to this scenario.5" The problem arises when a state witness describes
the area where the defendant was apprehended, or lived, as a high
crime area. The argument takes the following form: since the defend-
ant was located in a high crime area, he must be associated with the
criminal activity occurring there. In other words, if the area is one
where criminal activity takes place, the defendant must be a criminal.
This association could prejudice the defendant in the eyes of a jury,
especially when the defendant comes from an impoverished neighbor-
hood. A jury with a different cultural background than the defendant
that a person acted in conformity with that character, unless one of three exceptions
appear. The first two exceptions specifically refer to the "prosecution" and the "ac-
cused" and are only applicable in criminal cases. The third exception concerns attack-
ing the credibility of a witness, which is permitted in both civil and criminal cases
under sections 90.608-90.610. See C. EHRHARDT, supra note 21, at § 404.
52. 565 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
53. Id. at 330.
54. Id. at 331.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court ultimately affirmed the defendant's conviction, finding the error
to be harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
57. Jefferson v. State, 560 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Gillion v.
State, 547 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Black v. State, 545 So. 2d 498
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Huffman v. State, 500 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1987); Beneby v. State, 354 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 359
So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 1978).
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may simply be unable to accept the fact that an individual who lives in
a "designated high crime area" may not be a criminal.
The Florida courts have tried to address the issue to prevent the
needless reversal of convictions. The key issue is one of prejudice. Did
the evidence presented in court have the effect of demonstrating the
defendant's bad character, or was the use of this evidence admissible
for some other purpose which simply outweighs any prejudice it may
have had on the defendant? The courts have pointed to two factors
which prevent this evidence from reversing a defendant's convictions.
First, the identification of a neighborhood as a "high crime area" may
be considered de minimus if its use was merely descriptive.58 Second,
the evidence must be used for some purpose other than to demonstrate
the defendant's bad character .5  Typically the evidence is used to
demonstrate why a witness was in the neighborhood or why a witness
was more observant or alert than normal.
The "high crime area" evidence is fact specific. Therefore, what is
reversible in one case may not be in the next case. In Black v. State,6"
the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a drug conviction when
an objection was made to the testimony given by one of the police of-
ficers in the case. The officer stated that he had been watching several
areas of drug activity called "crack houses" and in particular the
"crack house" where the defendant was arrested. The officer also testi-
fied that numerous arrests were made here and that no "normal peo-
ple" live there.6 '
In Gillion v. State,e2 the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed
a drug conviction even though "high crime area" testimony was admit-
ted into evidence. The police officer in the case testified that the area
58. See, e.g., Jefferson v. State, 560 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Gillion v. State, 547 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989). The description was
considered de minimus since it was used for "mere identification." No mention was
made that the prosecutor in either case used the "high crime area" testimony in argu-
ment to the jury or that the prosecution tried to deliberately elicit the "high crime
area" testimony from the witness to demonstrate propensity. In Gillion, the fact that
the neighborhood was described as a high crime area was completely irrelevant and
could not have prejudiced the defendant, since the defendant was claiming mistaken
identity. Gillian, 547 So. 2d 719.
59. In Jefferson, the evidence was used to explain why the witness was sent to
this particular location and why the witness was monitored. Jefferson, 560 So. 2d at
1374.
60. 545 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
61. Id. at 499.
62. 547 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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was a "high crime area," and that several narcotics transactions were
taking place there. Additionally, he testified that there were many indi-
viduals known to him as narcotics dealers in the area, and that the
defendant was arrested in this area.63 The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal stated that the "mere identification of a neighborhood as a high-
crime area [should not] constitute [sic] reversible error in and of itself,
especially . . . where the defense is claiming mistaken identity. "64
D. Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts
Section 90.404(2) of the Florida Statutes, otherwise known as
"Williams Rule,"'65 or similar fact evidence, is one of the single biggest
causes for reversal in criminal cases. It prohibits the introduction of
other crimes, wrongs or acts to prove the defendant's propensity to
commit crime.6 However, evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue7
In order to utilize section 90.404(2), the State must notify the de-
fense in writing at least ten days prior to trial.6 8 The State must furnish
a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer as similar
fact evidence.69 If the evidence is used for impeachment or on rebuttal,
no notice is required.70 Additionally, if the evidence presented at trial is
"inextricably interwoven" or "inseparable" from the crime being
charged, there is no notice requirement.
The State in a criminal prosecution should never rely solely on the
evidence being "inseparable" and thus being outside of the ten day pro-
vision. If the court disagrees with the State's interpretation of the evi-
dence, the State will be precluded from using the similar fact evidence
as Williams rule material because it did not comply with the ten day
provision. The State should always file its ten day notice when possible
and cover itself should the court disagree with the argument that the
evidence is inseparable. However, whenever the State would have to tell
the story of the crime in a vacuum, or would have to leave out parts of
63. Id. at 720.
64. Id.
65. See Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847
(1959).
66. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (1989).
67. Id.
68. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b)l (1989).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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the story that would disrupt the logical sequence of events, the court
has ruled that the evidence is admissible because it is "inextricably in-
terwoven" with the main crime. In other words, it would be impossible
to illustrate the events surrounding the main crime, and give a uniform
picture of the event, without evidence of both crimes being given.71
In Erikson v. State,72 the Fourth District Court of Appeal allowed
the admission of collateral crimes evidence even though the State did
not comply with the ten day notice provision. In this case, both the
victim and another little girl were assaulted in the course of the day's
activities at a Parents Without Partners beach picnic. The touching of
the one young girl lead to the defendant's apprehension after a witness
observed the incident. The court held that this testimony, regarding
this uncharged crime, was relevant because it was so "inextricably in-
tertwined" in the scenario of the crime charged.7 3 The events leading to
the apprehension and detention of the defendant could not be given
without reference to the other crime, and therefore, it was admissible.74
A recent trend in the last few years has been the use of "reverse"
Williams rule, which develops when the defendant wants to use evi-
dence of crimes, wrongs, or acts of another to prove his innocence. Sec-
tion 90.404(2)(a) does not specifically preclude this use. Invariably, the
problem with this type of usage is defining its application. When sec-
tion 90.404(2)(a) is used within the criminal context, the evidence is
limited to evidence proving a material fact in issue, such as motive,
opportunity, intent, or identity.7 5 However, when applied as reverse
Williams rule, it is more difficult to demonstrate that evidence of the
crimes, wrongs or acts of a third person will prove a material fact in
issue. The only legitimate claim may be when identity is in issue and
the similar fact evidence, which the defense wishes to use, demonstrates
that an individual other than the defendant committed the crime.
Other applications take on a strained relationship with the rule.
Reverse Williams rule has been addressed sparingly by our district
courts.76 However, during the survey period, the Florida Supreme
71. See Austin v. State, 500 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Tumulty
v. State, 489 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
72. 565 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
73. Id. at 333.
74. Id.
75. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (1989).
76. See Brown v. State, 513 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Moreno v.
State, 418 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
1991] 1147
17
Bruschi: Evidence
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
Court faced this issue for the first time in Rivera v. State." In Rivera,
the defendant assaulted and killed a little girl and left her body in an
open field. The defendant attempted to establish that a crime of similar
nature had been committed by another person. The court stated that
"reverse" Williams rule is permissible and set out the standards on
which to base its admission.78 The court held that evidence which
tends, in any way, to establish a reasonable doubt should be admissi-
ble. 9 However, "the admissibility of this evidence must be gauged by
the same principle of relevancy as any other evidence offered by the
defendant."80 The court then examined the two crimes and found them
dissimilar.81 The Florida Supreme Court stated that since the two
crimes were dissimilar, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the evidence.82
The Florida Supreme Court again addressed the issue of reverse
Williams rule in State v. Savino. 3 In Savino, the defendant was
charged with the murder of his stepson. The stepson died of injuries
inflicted by blunt trauma to the stomach. The defendant advanced the
theory that his wife killed the boy. The defendant sought to introduce
evidence of the death of his wife's daughter seven years before, caused
by blunt trauma. However, the court found that the wife's alleged
abuse of a one month old child, in a different state, in a different mar-
riage, was not sufficiently similar to be admissible in the defendant's
trial for the death of the six year old child. 84 The court stated, once
again, that the admissibility of reverse Williams rule evidence is the
same as for any other evidence under section 90.404(b)(2).11 First, the
relevancy must be established, then the issue of prejudice must be
weighed.8 6 In Savino the court found that the defendant did not meet
the relevancy test.' In other words, the defendant did not demonstrate
the required close similarity of facts needed for the evidence to be
relevant.
77. 561 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1990).
78. Id. at 539.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 540.
82. Id.
83. 567 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1990).
84. Id. at 894.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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E. Rape Shield Law
Section 90.404(b) permits a criminal defendant to introduce perti-
nent character traits of a victim.88 However, this section of the evidence
code is specifically limited in rape cases by section 794.022, otherwise
known as the Florida Rape Shield Statute."9 This statute sets up a pro-
cedure to determine the admissibility of a victim's previous sexual con-
duct. Previous sexual conduct is ordinarily deemed inadmissible under
this statutory section, unless an in camera hearing is held prior to trial
to determine the relevance of the evidence.90
During the survey period, a significant amendment took place in
the Florida Rape Shield Statute.91 The amendment was fueled by a
highly publicized Broward County rape case. 2 In that case, the defense
claimed that the victim's provocative clothing was one of the catalysts
for the rape.93 The underlying defense theory was that it was a "drugs
for sex" scenario, which was set up by the victim's enticing clothing. 4
The verdict in the case came back not guilty, and the jury later stated
that the victim was "asking for it."' 95 The case caused a public furor
spurred on by newspaper and television coverage.
Fueled by public outrage, the legislature hastily amended section
794.022 to exclude evidence of the victim's manner of dress at the time
of the sexual assault.96 However, what the legislature failed to discover
was that the victim in the Broward rape case was later charged by the
State Attorney's Office for Trafficking and Conspiracy to Traffick in
88. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(b) (1989).
89. FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1989).
90. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (1989).
91. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 40 (West) amending FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1989).
The amendment affects the rules of evidence concerning relevancy. This change also
directly affects Florida Statutes section 90.404(1)(b)1, regarding the character of the
victim, by "excluding evidence presented for the purpose of showing that manner of
dress of the victim at the time of the offense incited the sexual battery." 1990 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. 40 (West).
92. State v. Lord, No. 88-024726CF10A (Broward County Fla. 1988). The case
was prosecuted by James DeHart of the State Attorney's Office Sexual Battery Unit
and the case was defended by Timothy Day of the Public Defender's Office. Both attor-
neys had extensive experience in trying sexual battery cases.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1989).
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Cocaine of over 400 grams.9 7 She was found guilty in a jury trial of
Conspiracy to Traffick in Cocaine and was sentenced to the minimum
fifteen year mandatory drug trafficking sentence.9 8
It appears, based on the whole story, that the defense in the rape
case was, in fact, much more than mere puffery. The victim's drug
trafficking charges supported the defense theory that the rape was a
"drugs for sex" set-up that went bad.9 9 Provocative dress was needed in
the set-up to attract the next target. 00
Though the intention of the new legislation was to protect the vic-
tim, and discourage the jury from deciding the case based merely on
the manner of dress, the same protection could have been afforded by
relying on logical relevancy and the trial judge's common sense.
Though rapes are insidious crimes, the legislature's attempt to protect
the victim, at any cost, could backfire on the wrongly accused defend-
ant by unfairly preventing him from presenting favorable evidence on
his behalf.' 0 '
IV. PRIVILEGES
A significant case in the area of attorney-client privilege did not
come from the Florida Courts but instead emanated from the United
States Supreme Court. In United States v. Zolin,0 2 the Supreme
97. State v. Chiapponi, No. 89-26532CF10B (Broward County Fla. 1989).
98. Id.
99. The author does not wish to leave the impression that the defendant was not
a culpable party in this case. However, had all the facts been known to the prosecuting
attorney from the beginning, he may have attempted to try the case in a different
manner to alleviate any damaging testimony, thus, enhancing his chances for a
favorable outcome. The prosecuting attorney may also have changed his posture on
plea negotiations.
In trial, the jury was confronted with a very plausible defense, bolstered by the
victim's lack of emotion upon her narration of the rape. In contrast, another rape vic-
tim that testified at the trial was extremely emotional upon recounting the events sur-
rounding her rape by the same defendant. Additionally, the defense managed to hurt
the credibility of the victim by pointing out inconsistencies in her testimony and dem-
onstrating her unwillingness to cooperate with the State's prosecution of the case. The
victim's unwillingness to cooperate was all the more revealing when it was later learned
that she was involved in drug trafficking. Id.
100. Please see the case file and accompanying reports in State v. Chiapponi, No.
89-26532CF10B (Broward County Fla. 1989), located in the Broward County Clerk's
Office.
101. See, e.g., Dobson, Evidence, 11 NOVA L. REV. 1291, 1328 n.176 (1987).
102. 109 S. Ct. 2619 (1989).
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Court discussed the attorney-client privilege in relation to the "crime-
fraud" exception.103 The Court set up a procedure to determine how
the "crime-fraud" exception should be applied in privilege cases. Since
Florida has implicitly recognized the "crime-fraud" exception, the
opinion should offer guidance in privileged matters.1 04
In Zolin, the IRS, as part of its investigation of the tax returns of
L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scientology, attempted
to enforce a summons on the Clerk of the Los Angeles County Court
103. The "crime-fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege simply stands
for the proposition that confidential communications between an attorney and his client
do not extend to communications made for the purpose of getting advice for the com-
mission of a fraud or crime. Though the phrase "crime-fraud exception" is not gener-
ally used in Florida courts, the exception has been recognized in -Florida cases. See
Florida Mining & Materials v. Continental Casualty, 556 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gellert, 431 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Leithauser v. Harrison, 168 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 19.64); see also
FLA. STAT. § 90.502(4)(a) (1989). The "crime-fraud" exception applies to both the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. See In re Doe,.662 F.2d 1073
(4th Cir. 1981); In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.
1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC), 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979). The Third
Circuit Court of Appeal stated:
The two privileges [attorney-client and work-product] are separate and
distinct, but there is an overlap. Information furnished by the client to the
lawyer may merge into his work-product; moreover, the overriding purpose
of the two privileges is the same-to encourage proper functioning of the
adversary system. From this viewpoint, there is no actual inconsistency in
applying the crime-fraud exception to the work-product as well as to the
attorney-client privilege. The rationale supporting the exception in both
areas is virtually identical. The work-product privilege is perverted if it is
used to further illegal activities as is the attorney-client privilege, and
there are no overpowering considerations in either situation that would jus-
tify the shielding of evidence that aids continuing or future, criminal
activity.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 802.
The crime-fraud exception to attorney-client communications is becoming a popu-
lar tool to combat criminal activity of attorneys and their clients. As prosecutors ag-
gressively pursue their cases, the Florida courts will find more and more cases involving
confidential materials at their doorstep. See Glanzer & Taskier, Attorneys Before the
Grand Jury: Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect a Client's Identity,
75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1070 (1984); Silbert, The Crime-Fraud Exception to
the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine, The Lawyer's Obligations
of Disclosure, and the Lawyer's Response to Accusation of Wrongful Conduct, 23
AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 351 (1986).
104. Kneale v. Williams, 158 Fla. 811, 30 So. 2d 284 (1947); Roberts v. Jardine,
366 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see also Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619.
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for documents and two tapes in his possession concerning a pending
suit. The Church of Scientology opposed the production of these mater-
ials by claiming they were privileged. The IRS claimed the materials
fell within the "crime-fraud" exception because the material was in
furtherance of future illegal conduct. The IRS urged the federal dis-
trict court to listen to the tapes in making its privilege de'termination.
The district court ruled that the tapes need not be produced, since they
contained privileged attorney-client communications to which the
crime-fraud exception did not apply. 10 5 The district court refused to
listen to the tapes in an in camera review to determine if the privilege
existed. 10 6 The court of appeal stated that the district court was power-
less to grant the IRS demand for in camera review of the tapes because
the Government's evidence of crime or fraud must come from sources
independent of the attorney-client communications on the tape.10 7
The United States Supreme Court, however, held that in camera
review may be used to determine whether allegedly privileged attorney-
client communications fall within the crime-fraud exception. 08 There-
fore, when determining whether material is privileged or not, the lower
court may examine the material in camera before it makes its determi-
nation. The Supreme Court reasoned that in camera review was a
lesser intrusion upon the confidentiality of the attorney-client relation-
ship than public disclosure. 10 9
The Court also held that before the lower court could engage in an
in camera review at the request of the party opposing the privilege,
"that party must present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable be-
lief that in camera review may yield evidence that establishes the ex-
ceptions's applicability."" 0 The Court believed that this would elimi-
nate "fishing expeditions" and the enormous burden on the court
system in examining voluminous records generated by parties opposing
the privilege."' The evidence does not have to be independent of the
privileged materials and, in fact, may be used not only for the in cam-
era review but can also be used for the ultimate showing that the
105. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. at 2621-22.
106. Id. at 2622.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2632.
109. Id. at 2630.
110. 109 S. Ct. at 2630. This rule only applies to a party who opposes the privi-
lege. The party that holds the privilege does not need to meet this criteria and may ask
for in camera review of the privileged material at anytime. Id.
111. Id.
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crime-fraud exception applies.
Finally, the Court stated that "the threshold showing to obtain in
camera review may be met by using any relevant evidence, lawfully
obtained, that has not been adjudicated to be privileged. 11'  In order
for evidence to be adjudicated privileged, the lower court must make
specific factual findings as to the privileged nature of the materials.
Therefore, simply because one of the parties claims that the material is
privileged does not prevent a court from considering the material. The
court must make a specific factual finding regarding the privileged na-
ture of the information to prevent its consideration.
Florida practitioners who have cases concerning privileged mate-
rial should examine the procedures promulgated by Zolin when there is
an attempt to abrogate the privilege using the "crime-fraud" exception.
A "Zolin Inquiry" should be used to determine the privileged nature of
the communications and the applicability of the "crime-fraud"
exception.
V. WITNESSES
A. Impeaching One's Own Witness
Perhaps the biggest change in the Florida Evidence Code deals
with impeachment. The legislature amended section 90.608 to allow
impeachment of one's own witness.1 3 This brings Florida in line with
the Federal Rules of Evidence which also allow impeachment of one's
own witness.: 4 The change will probably cause some initial problems
112. Id. at 2632 (emphasis added).
113. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 174 (West), amending FLA. STAT. § 90.608
(1989). Section 90.608 now reads as follows:
Any party, including the party callingthe witness, may attack the credibil-
ity of a witness by:
(1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with his
present testimony.
(2) Showing that the witness is biased.
(3) Attacking the character of the witness in accordance with the provi-
sions of s. 90.609 or s. 90.610.
(4) Showing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to
observe, remember, or recount the matters about which he testified.
(5) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by
the witness being impeached.
FLA. STAT. § 90.608 (1989).
114. See FED. R. EvID. 607 ("The credibility of a witness may be attacked by
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in criminal cases, since the prosecution may be -inclined to call "ad-
verse" witnesses and then impeach the witness in an attempt to use the
impeaching evidence to bolster its case." 5 Since prior inconsistent
statements used for impeachment purposes cannot be used as substan-
tive evidence,"16 the State must be cautious, and the defense must be on
guard to avoid having the impeaching statements argued to the jury as
substantive evidence." 7 After a witness is impeached, opposing counsel
should ask the court for a limiting instruction to inform the jury that
the impeaching statement cannot be used as substantive evidence.
B. Impeachment by Other Witnesses with Inconsistent Material
Facts
Section 90.608(1)(e) allows proof, by other witnesses, that the ma-
terial facts testified to are not the same as testified to by the witness
being impeached. 18 One case worth noting was heard during the sur-
vey period. In Garcia v. State,"' the defendant was charged with the
first degree murder of two elderly women. There was little evidence in
the case linking the defendant to the crime scene. However, the defend-
ant was a farm field laborer at the same time and place as one of the
State's witnesses. This witness overheard the defendant talk about the
murder and testified about this conversation at trial. The defense at-
tempted to impeach the witness by demonstrating that at the time of
the alleged conversation., the defendant was no longer working at the
farm. 20 The defense attempted to enter the payroll records to cast
doubt on the credibility of the State's witness. The trial court disal-
lowed this and the jury found the defendant guilty.' 2 '
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction
any party, including the party calling the witness.").
115. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The State cannot use the im-
peaching statements as substantive evidence unless the statement is brought in under
section 90.801(2)(a).
116. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations).
117. See Everett v. State, 530 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (where
the defendant's conviction was reversed because the State attempted to use the im-
peaching statements as substantive evidence during closing argument, despite the
court's earlier warning that the statements were not to be considered as substantive
evidence).
118. FLA. STAT. § 90.608(1)(e) (1989).
119. 564 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1990).
120. Id. at 125.
121. Id. at 126.
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and sentence of death in the case. 2 2 The court found that the failure of
the defense to impeach with the payroll records, plus the State's argu-
ment that the records were unavailable, lead the court to conclude that
the error could not be harmless.1 23 The court reasoned that the payroll
records could have impeached "a crucial link in the chain of circum-
stantial evidence."' 24 Without this link, there was little other evidence
to tie the defendant to the crime. Therefore, the credibility of the wit-
ness was central to the State's case and failure to allow the jury to
weigh this impeaching evidence against this witness justified the court's
reversal of the conviction.
C. Bias
Demonstrating a witness's bias or motivation to testify falsely is
one of the strongest arguments for the admissibility of what otherwise
would be considered highly prejudicial evidence. Counsel should always
examine a witness's testimony for any possible motivation or bias that
would allow the admissibility of such evidence.
In McCrae v. State,125 the Third District Court of Appeal reversed
the defendant's conviction of attempted murder when the trial court
refused to allow defense counsel to demonstrate a witness's bias. In
McCrae, the defendant attempted to elicit testimony that the State's
sole witness, and the victim of the crime, was in fact a drug dealer who
may have been shot by a third party during a drug deal.126 The defense
argued that the trial testimony was an attempt to conceal that fact by
blaming the shooting on the defendant. The district court dismissed the
State's argument that this was merely a facade to demonstrate the wit-
ness's bad character, and stated that evidence which is inadmissible for
one purpose can be admissible for another purpose under the rule of
"limited admissibility."' 27 Since the State's case rested solely on the
testimony of one witness, it was reversible error to exclude relevant evi-
dence demonstrating the possible bias or motivation of the witness to
testify falsely.
In Hernandez v. Ptomey,'12 the Third District Court of Appeal
122. Id. at 129.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 549 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
126. Id. at 1123.
127. See FLA. STAT. § 90.107 (1989).
128. 549 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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again discussed bias and motivation of a witness. In Hernandez, de-
fense counsel attempted to elicit that the State's witness was under in-
ternal review investigation for actions in other cases. 129 The court rec-
ognized that the defense has an absolute right to examine any possible
motivation of a State witness when that motivation may skew the wit-
ness' testimony in favor of the State. However, the district court went
on and discussed that "charges of unrelated offenses against a defense
witness are not proper grounds for impeachment." 30 The court con-
cluded that if the State can demonstrate, based on the pending charges,
that the defense witness would color his testimony, then tile bias testi-
mony should be admissible.' Note that the State should be cautious
and avoid attempting to demonstrate a "general bias" by the witness
against the State." 2 Though most witnesses being charged by the State
will probably have a general bias against the State, the testimony re-
garding a pending charge (such as murder) would probably be more
prejudicial than the general bias evidence would be probative.
D. Negative Impeachment
Florida case law has stated that mere negative use of a police re-
port for impeachment should not be allowed.' 3 3 However, this blanket
restriction is often interpreted too broadly. In State v. Johnson, the
preeminent case on negative impeachment, the Florida Supreme Court
set forth a four-part test to determine if negative impeachment should
be allowed. The court stated that "[i]t depends, as we have said, upon
1) being critical 2) upon a material and vital point 3) reasonably excul-
patory of defendant, within sound judicial discretion, and 4) after 'in
camera' review and deletion of any improper matter."' 34 The "critical"
issue in Johnson was the fact that the officer testified at trial that the
defendant had white powder on his jacket but left this information out
of his police report.3 5 The Johnson court found that failure to allow
129. Id. at 758.
130. Id. (emphasis in original)
131. Id.
132. See Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1976) (discussing that a general
bias is not a proper subject for impeachment).
133. State v. Johnson, 284 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
134. Id. at 201.
135. Id. at 199. The white powder was considered important because tle entry
point of the burglary in the Johnson case was a two by three foot hole surrounded by a
white powdery substance.
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the use of negative impeachment in that case caused reversible error. 136
Today, Florida courts use the Johnson case as a blanket restriction
on the use of negative impeachment for police reports and rarely con-
sider the four-part test promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court. A
prime illustration of this is the case of Jimenez v. State.137 In Jimenez,
the defendant appealed his conviction for possession and sale of cocaine
on the grounds the trial court precluded him from impeaching the of-
ficer's testimony regarding an incriminating fact which the officer left
off his police reports.13 8 At trial, the officer testified that he "observed
the defendant arrive at the scene of the transaction carrying a silver
box and exit shortly thereafter with a bag which officers had earlier
filled with cash."139 The officer did not note this in his police reports.140
The appellate court affirmed the conviction concluding that no error
had occurred concerning the precluded use of negative impeachment on
this issue.14 ' However, the appellate court failed to even acknowledge
that this evidence may have fit within the four-part test enunciated in
Johnson.42 Since the charge was for sale and possession of cocaine, it
would seem that the methodology of the transaction could be critical on
the material issue of possession and, therefore, could have exculpated
the defendant if the jury did not believe the officer.143 It is hard to
discern how the failure to report the methodology of a drug transaction
in Jimenez is any less critical than the failure to report a white pow-
dery substance on a jacket in Johnson. However, this will be left for
another day and another court. 44
136. Id. at 200.
137. 554 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
138. Id. at 16.
139. Id. at 16.
140. It seems somewhat odd that an officer doing a drug bust would fail to men-
tion in any of his reports the method by which the contraband was transported.
141. Jimenez, 554 So. 2d at 16.
142. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
143. The author believes the current viability of negative impeachment may be
in doubt.
144. The continued vitality of Johnson should also be questioned in light of the
changes in the rules of criminal discovery. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220
now restricts the use of depositions in cases where the officer's "knowledge of the case
is fully set out in a police report or other statement furnished to the defense." FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(i)(b) (emphasis added). Since the incident must be "fully set
out," this implies that material left out of the report should in all fairness be explored
by defense counsel by the use of negative impeachment.
Additionally, depositions in criminal misdemeanor cases no longer exist, unless
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E. Impeachment by Lack of Mental Capacity or Defect
The Florida Supreme Court, in Edwards v. State,145 settled a con-
flict between the district courts of appeal regarding the prejudicial use
of a witness' drug addiction during trial. In Edwards, the evidence at
trial established that the defendant stabbed the victim with a knife.
During the trial, the defense proffered the cross-examination testimony
of the victim concerning her prior drug use. The proffered testimony
demonstrated that the victim had been using drugs for twenty years
but had been clean for the past several years. The victim's proffer also
included the fact that she was not using drugs at the time of the inci-
dent and that during her testimony she was not using drugs. 4 ' Defense
counsel argued for the admittance of the victim's prior drug use to
demonstrate that the victim was not a credible witness and that her
prior drug use would impair her ability to perceive and remember. The
trial court rejected this argument and excluded the proffered testimony
but allowed the defense to question the victim about drug use on the
days preceding the incident and on the night of the incident. 47
The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the defendant's con-
viction and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.' 48 The Florida Su-
preme Court noted that authoritative commentators have taken adverse
views regarding the relevance of prior drug usage. 49 The court cited
Professor Ehrhardt and Professor McCormick's views thai: evidence of
prior drug usage, other than during the incident or at trial, is admissi-
ble only if it can be demonstrated to be "relevant to the witness's abil-
ity to observe, remember and recount."' 50 However, the court noted
that Professor Graham took a contrary view indicating that drug addic-
tion possesses at least the minimum probative value necessary to estab-
lish relevancy, and the evidence could be excluded if it leads to unfair
prejudice or could possibly mislead the jury.15' The Supreme Court
good cause is demonstrated. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(iii). Therefore, failure to allow
the defense to fully utilize negative impeachment may cut off the defendant's only
method of defense.
145. 548 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1989).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 657.
150. Id. (quoting C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 608.6 (2d ed. 1984)); see
also E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 45 (3d ed. 1984).
151. Edwards, 548 So. 2d at 657-58 (citing M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FLOR-
[Vol. 151158
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held that the introduction of evidence of drug use for the purpose of
impeachment would be excluded unless:
(a) it can be shown that the witness had been using drugs at or
about the time of the incident which is the subject of the witness's
testimony;
(b) it can be shown that the witness is using drugs at or about the
time of the testimony itself; or
(c) it is expressly shown by other relevant evidence that the prior
drug use affects the witness's ability to observe, remember and
recount. 152
This three-part test should aid the trial courts in discerning when
impeachment by drug use is admissible at trial. Through Professor
Graham's view that drug addiction possesses at least minimum proba-
tive value, it would seem that if the drug addiction did not fall within
the three-part test, it would probably be more prejudicial than proba-
tive and should be excluded.
F. Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation
Two cases during the survey period established the importance of
understanding the bounds of cross-examination. In Eberhardt v.
State,""' the appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction and
sentence for burglary when the trial court failed to allow the defense to
question and explore all the facts relevant to the defendant's intoxi-
cated state or condition. The State, on direct examination, elicited tes-
timony that two witnesses found the defendant asleep in a desk chair
inside the burglarized structure. On cross-examination, defense counsel
was prohibited from asking the witnesses whether the defendant ap-
peared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The appellate
court found this to be error, since the State opened the door by asking
about the defendant's condition and appearance.15 4
The State also elicited testimony from a police witness regarding
statements made by the defendant. When defense counsel attempted to
elicit the whole conversation from the witness, the State objected on
IDA EVIDENCE § 608.4 (1987)).
152. Id. at 658.
153. 550 So. 2d 102 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
154. Id. at 105.
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hearsay grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection. 5 The ap-
pellate court once again found error and stated that the "rule of com-
pleteness"'156 allowed admission of the "balance of the conversation as
well as other related conversations that in fairness are necessary for the
jury to accurately perceive the whole context of what has transpired
between the two.' 57 Trial counsel should be aware that once a state-
ment is elicited, opposing counsel has the right to explore other parts of
the conversation free from any hearsay objections.
In Ellis v. State,58 the defendant was convicted of trafficking in
cocaine and conspiracy to traffick in cocaine. After the State rested its
case, the defendant took the stand and denied both of the charges. The
defense counsel argued that these denials did not open the door for
further questioning by the State. The trial court disagreed and in-
structed the jury to disregard the defendant's testimony after he re-
fused to answer the State's cross-examination questions.15" The appel-
late court affirmed the convictions and noted that once the defendant
takes the stand he does so as any other witness and, therefore, may be
cross-examined as any other witness.'6 0 Before committing a client to
the stand, defense counsel should always inform his client that he will
be treated, for cross-examination purposes, as any other witness and
will be unable to reclaim the safeguards against self-incrimination
whenever cross-examination becomes inconvenient.
VI. EXPERTS
One of the most interesting subjects to come along in recent years,
in the area of expert testimony, is the psychological autopsy. 16 The
admissibility of such evidence was first discussed in this state in Jack-
son v. State.' In Jackson, Judge Glickstein concurred specially and
framed the issue as follows:
[W]hether a psychological autopsy performed on a suicide victim is
155. Id.
156. FLA. STAT. § 90.108 (1989).
157. Eberhardt, 550 So. 2d at 105.
158. 550 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. A psychological autopsy is a retrospective look at an individual's suicide to
try to determine what lead the person to choose death over life.
162. 553 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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proper evidence in a criminal case charging the defendant with
child abuse in the form of the defendant causing her seventeen-
year old daughter mental injury by requiring her to work as a strip
dancer to earn money and that the defendant's demands on the
child caused her such stress that she took her own life to escape the
situation.163
The State charged the defendant with child abuse, pursuant to
section 827.04(1) of the Florida Statutes. In order to help establish the
child abuse, the State used a psychological autopsy to demonstrate that
the nature of the relationship between the defendant and her daughter
was a substantial contributing factor in the daughter's decision to com-
mit suicide. The underlying facts gleaned from Judge Glickstein's con-
curring opinion demonstrate that the victim wa's forced, by her mother,
the defendant, to work as a strip dancer at a nightclub to earn
money.164 Doctor Jacob, the State's expert witness, established the
foundation for his expert opinion by testifying to his previous work as a
pioneering psychologist at UCLA, interviewing people who attempted
suicide and the surrounding basis of his findings during that study.'65
He also testified that psychological autopsies are required by many hos-
pitals when there is a suicide. The doctor then examined the life of
Tina Mancini, the teenage victim. At trial, the doctor brought out a
previous suicide attempt of the victim, her dysfunctional family atmo-
sphere, her attempts to get away from her mother, her calls for help,
and the method of her death.
The appellate court found that the expert witness' review of the
victim's school records, police reports, medical records, testimony from
various witnesses at the trial, and an incident report from an earlier
suicide attempt established the foundation for his expert opinion that
the relationship between the defendant and her daughter contributed to
the daughter's decision to commit suicide.' 6 Additionally, the court
found that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that the
"psychological autopsy is accepted in the field of psychiatry as a
method of evaluation for use in cases involving suicide and the trial
judge acted within his discretion in admitting this evidence at trial.' 61 7
163. Id. at 720 (Glickstein, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 719.
165. Id. at 721.
166. Id. at 720.
167. Id.
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VII. HEARSAY
Hearsay case law once again tops the list for the total number of
evidentiary cases contributed to this area. However, few cases made
any noticeable changes in the evidentiary law, though a fev are worth
discussing.
A. Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence
Florida Statutes section 90.801(2)(a) allows a prior inconsistent
statement to be used as substantive evidence when certain prerequisites
are met."' In Dudley v. State,16 9 these prerequisites were not met. The
facts in Dudley surround a plan to kill an elderly woman who had fired
the defendant's mother from her job as the woman's companion. The
defendant, along with her boyfriend, went to the woman's house and
cut her throat. During the trial, the State attempted to have the de-
fendant's former boyfriend called as a witness to elicit statement's
made by the defendant regarding the murder. The statements were
made to a detective and an assistant state attorney during the police
investigation. The trial court granted the State's request, and the State
impeached the witness with the prior inconsistent statementsY.7 0 The
trial court initially instructed the jury that the testimony could not be
considered as substantive evidence. However, the State, in its final ar-
gument to the jury, and its argument before the judge, argued the prior
inconsistent statement as substantive evidence.17 '
On appeal, the State relied on section 90.801(2)(a) for the pro-
position that the statements could be argued as substantive evidence,
reasoning that they fell within the "other proceeding" section of the
rule.'17 The Florida Supreme Court disagreed and held "that this type
of law enforcement investigation and inquiry was not an 'other proceed-
168. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2) (1989). This section provides in part:
(2) A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hear-
ing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the
statement is:
(a) Inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding or in a deposition
169. 545 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1989).
170. Id. at 858.
171. Id. at 859.
172. Id.
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ing' under the code and, consequently, section 90.801(2)(a) did not
apply. 173
B. Prior Consistent Statements
A typical problem associated with the use of prior consistent state-
ments is the failure of counsel attempting to admit this evidence to
properly have a time line of events squarely in place. 17-4 Basically, what
this amounts to is knowing whether the consistent statement was made
before or after the charge of improper influence, motive, or recent
fabrication. State v. Lazarowicz175 illustrates this problem. In
Lazarowicz, the State charged the defendant with sexual battery of a
child by a person in position of familial authority, pursuant to section
794.011 and 794.041 of the Florida Statutes. The defendant's seven-
teen-year old daughter testified that when she asked her father's per-
mission to attend a school function with her boyfriend, her father de-
nied the request and forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. He
then rescinded the refusal. The trial court admitted the statements
made by the daughter prior to trial, which were consistent with her in
court testimony.17 6
The appellate court found that the prior consistent statements
were in fact made after an improper motive arose.177 The defense
claimed that the daughter had fabricated the charges of sexual battery
to prevent her father from being in a position to prevent her from
maintaining an active sexual relationship with her boyfriend. 178 The
daughter's motive was indicated by her failure to report her father to
the authorities until one week after she first engaged in sexual inter-
course with her boyfriend. 7 9 Statements made after this improper mo-
tive would not be admissible under section 90.801(2)(b). At trial, vari-
ous witnesses testified regarding the prior consistent statements.
However, all these statements occurred after the improper motive
arose, not before, and therefore, all the statements were inadmissible
under section 90.801(2)(b).
173. Id.
174. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b) (1989).
175. 561 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
176. Id. at 393.
177. Id. at 394.
178. Id. at 393.
179. Id.
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In Stewart v. State,18 ° a prior consistent statement was allowed
because the charge of recent fabrication occurred after the statement.
In Stewart, the defendant was charged with first degree murder. Dur-
ing trial, the state elicited testimony from a witness that the defendant
had related details of the crime to him. The defense claimed that the
witness fabricated his testimony to obtain favorable treatment from the
State in his sentencing on other charges.'" 1 However, the prior consis-
tent statement, regarding the details of the crime, was made before the
convictions had been obtained and the sentencing pending.'82 There-
fore, the statements were not hearsay under section 90.801(2)(b).
C. Spontaneous Statement and Excited Utterance
An interesting case analyzing both the spontaneous statement'83
and excited utterance'" exceptions to the hearsay rule arose in the case
of Sunn v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co.'85 In that case, after the plain-
tiff purchased a boat, he then purchased insurance coverage for it from
Colonial Penn Insurance Company. The plaintiff conspired with an-
other individual, Joseph Keeton, to burn the boat and collect the insur-
ance proceeds.' 88 The plan backfired when the boat exploded. Joseph
Keeton was badly burned and returned home. After approximately 20
hours, Mr. Keeton told his son how he got the burns and informed him
about the conspiracy. The insurance company denied the plaintiff's
claim for reimbursement for the loss of the boat because the coverage
excluded intentional acts done by the policy holder. On a motion for
summary judgment, the parties stipulated that judgement could be en-
tered for the insurance company if the statements constituted compe-
tent evidence.'8 7 The trial court held that the statements were admissi-
ble and granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers. 8 The
plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the insurance company argued that the statements
were properly admitted as spontaneous statements or excited utter-
180. 558 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1990).
181. Id. at 419.
182. Id.
183. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(1) (1989).
184. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2) (1989).
185. 556 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
186. Id. at 1157.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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ances. The appellate court listed the factors to be analyzed in determin-
ing whether a statement qualifies under the exceptions, stating that
these were "(a) the time gap between the incident and the statement,
(b) the voluntariness of the statement, (c) whether the statement is
self-serving, and (d) the declarant's mental and physical state at the
time the statement was made.1 8
9
The appellate court found that the most important of these factors
is the duration of time between the incident and the statement. 190 The
longer the time, the more chance of reflective thought in which to
fabricate a statement. The appellate court held that the case did not
provide a sufficient basis to conclude that the declarant made the state-
ments without reflective thought and, thus, the standards for spontane-
ity as to the hearsay statements had not been proven by the insurers. 91
Therefore, it was error to grant the summary judgement in favor of the
defendant. 192
D. Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis
In Bradley v. State,9 3 the appellate court reversed a rape convic-
tion when the trial court erroneously admitted a hearsay statement that
the victim was raped. The victim was raped by the defendant on July 4,
1987. The victim testified that a month later she told her mother about
the incident. A few days later, the victim went to a family planning
clinic for a pregnancy test and physical exam. While she was there she
told a staff member that she had been raped on July 4, 1987 and the
staff member wrote down "raped 7-4-87" on the victim's health history
form. 9 4
At trial, the State entered this form as a statement for medical
diagnosis under section 90.803(4). 111 The defense objected to the part
of the form where it mentioned the victim had been raped. The trial
189. Id. at 1157-58.
190. 556 So. 2d at 1158.
191. Id.
192. Compare Edmond v. State, 559 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(where the court held that an I 1 year old witness' emotional description of an assailant
to the police approximately two to three hours after the incident was admissible as an
excited utterance, because the child was still excited and hysterical at the time the
statement was made).
193. 546 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
194. Id. at 446.
195. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(4) (1989).
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court overruled the objection and the jury found the defendant
guilty.' 96 The appellate court reversed and reasoned tha: it was im-
proper to allow the statement into evidence. 197 The court found that
only "statements which describe the inception or cause of the injury if
they are reasonably pertinent to the treatment are . . . within the ex-
ception."'9 8 The purpose of the victim's visit was not to receive treat-
ment for injuries due to the rape but to substantiate her suspicion that
she was pregnant. Therefore, the statement the victim gave to the
clinical staff member was not reasonably pertinent to the diagnosis of
whether the victim was pregnant, and it was error to allow the state-
ment into evidence as a hearsay exception under 90.803(4).
In Danzy v. State,'99 the same district court of appeal came to an
entirely different conclusion than the Bradley case. In this case, the
victim was staying with her girlfriend and the defendant while recover-
ing from a car accident. On the morning of the crime, the victim went
to wake the defendant for work. The defendant then picked the victim
up and carried her into the living room where the sexual assault oc-
curred. The victim attempted to leave the apartment and fell down the
stairs while exiting.
Upon returiing to the medical center for treatment of her injuries,
the doctor noticed that the victim was obviously upset and felt it was
necessary to learn why the victim was so upset and why she had fallen.
Upon learning of the incident the doctor instructed the victim to go to
the hospital to obtain a rape examination. 00
At trial, the defendant objected to the testimony of the doctor and
his nurse regarding the rape, arguing that it was hearsay. The appellate
court found that the statement fell within the hearsay exception for
purposes of medical diagnosis20' and distinguished the Bradley case.202
The court stated that in Bradley the only purpose was to determine
whether the victim was pregnant.203 In contrast, in Danzy the state-
ment made to the doctor was made only hours after the incident had
occurred and was made after repeated requests by the doctor who be-
lieved his patient's emotional condition was a consideration in his ex-
196. Bradley, 546 So. 2d at 446.
197. Id. at 447.
198. Id. (quoting C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 803.4 (2d ed. 1984)).
199. 553 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st Dist, Ct. App. 1989).
200. Id.
201. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(4) (1989).
202. Danzy, 553 So. 2d at 381.
203. Id.
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amination.114 Therefore, the court found that the "circumstances under
which the statement was made and the purpose for which the same was
elicited thus insure its trustworthiness and admissibility under the evi-
dence code."205
VIII. CONCLUSION
The vast number of evidentiary cases will continue to fill the case
books on a daily basis. Attorneys should be aware of the new changes
that have been made by our legislature and listed herein. Every attor-
ney should strive to understand how the changes can be applied in a
courtroom setting. Some of these changes will go by unnoticed, others
are sure to generate even more case law. Though not every evidentiary
case will cause earth-shaking changes, the methodology and analysis
supplied by the appellate courts will aid the trial attorney in the appli-
cation of these rules during trial.
With the volume of new evidentiary and substantive case law be-
ing produced every day, the trial attorney should strive to cull through
the cases to develop a notebook of helpful cases. In this manner the
attorney will have the cases he needs at his fingertips. With the advent
of computer technology, the trial attorney can keep a simple notebook
system of case law updated on a regular basis with a minimum of work.
204. Id.
205. Id. The court focused on the rationale behind the admissibility of the state-
ments by focusing in on the patient's motive to be truthful, because the diagnosis or
treatment will depend on what the patient will say. Id. An additional degree of trust-
worthiness is displayed when the information will be relied upon by the physician in
making his diagnosis or determining treatment.
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